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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
-------------------------------------------------------
JACOBSEN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
INC., a corporation; JELCO, INC., 
a corporation; and CENTRAL UTAH 
WATER CONSERVANCY DISTRICT, 
a body corporate and politic, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. 
STRUCTO-LITE ENGINEERING, INC., 
a corporation, 
Defendant-Third-Party 
Plaintiff-Appellant. 
Case No. 16208 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
INTRODUCTION 
Appellant Structo-Lite Engineering, Inc. submits 
this brief in reply to the brief of respondents Jacobsen 
Construction Company, Inc., Jelco, Inc., and Central Utah 
Water Conservancy District. The purpose of this brief 
is not to further expound on the arguments raised in 
appellants' original brief, but to respond to new issues 
raised in respondents' brief, as well as to clarify and 
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correct some significant mistakes of law contained in 
the respondents' brief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ASSUMPTION OF RISK AS A 
COMPLETE BAR IS NOT 
ELIMINATED BY COMPARATIVE 
NEGLIGENCE EXCEPT AS IT 
TRACKS CONTRIBUTORY NEGLI-
GENCE. RIGTRUP v. STRAWBERRY 
WATER USERS ASSOCIATION IS 
NOT CONTRARY. 
Respondents go to great length in their brief 
to show that appellant's reliance on the case of Rigtrup 
v. Strawberry Water Users Association, 563 P.2d 1247 
(Utah 1977) is misplaced; that rather than standing for 
the proposition that the defense of assumption of the 
risk may still operate as a complete bar in a negligence 
action, the opinion of the Court requires that comparative 
negligence be applied in assumption of risk type situa-
tions. Appellant freely admits that the language of the 
Court's opinion in Rigtrup is susceptible to such an 
interpretation. However, the opinion in Rigtrup is based 
upon the assumption that the trial court applied the 
comparative negligence statute in entering its verdict 
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of no cause of action against the plaintiff - Rigtrup. 
Id. at 1250. While this may certainly be the case, it 
is equally as probable that, based upon the instructions 
and the answers to the interrogatories on the special 
verdict, the lower court in Rigtrup entered judgment 
based on the fact that the jury found plaintiff had as-
sumed the risk of the damages under an instruction which 
stated that a finding of assumption of the risk would 
bar recovery if the elements of that defense were present. 
As pointed out by respondents, it makes a great 
deal of difference in the application of the assumption 
of risk doctrine whether the use of the doctrine is based 
upon actual knowledge of the danger or merely failure to 
discover it. [Brief of Respondents at p. 14]. The 
actual knowledge or "primary type" assumption of the risk 
more closely tracks the issue of a defendant's duty, 
while the should have discovered or "secondary type" 
certainly equates with contributory negligence. Presum-
ably respondents will not argue that the adoption of 
comparative negligence has eliminated the legal require-
ment that a defendant must owe a duty to plaintiff be-
fore he is liable in a negligence action. To read 
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Ri9trup as abrogating this requirement simply because it 
i• couched in terms of assumption of risk may create an 
ideal situation for a plaintiff but appeliant contends 
that it is clearly not the intent of the Supreme Court of 
this State. 
Respondents further argue that even if assump-
tion of the risk remains as a defense and bar that 
appellant is precluded from asserting it by appellant's 
failure to specify during the course of the proceedings 
whether appellant was relying on assumption of risk in 
its "primary" or "secondary" sense. Unfortunately for 
respondents' position, the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
only require that the defense be pled affirmatively as 
"assumption of risk"; no requirement of pleading by 
degree is stated. Rule 8(c), Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. 
In the course of discovery procedures, and as 
a result of appellant's proposed instructions to the 
jury, respondents should have been aware of the fact that 
appellant intended to raise the doctrine as a defense at 
trial. 
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POINT II 
UTAH CASE LAW ESTABLISHES 
THAT ASSUMPTION OF RISK IS 
A DEFENSE TO A CLAIM FOR 
BREACH OF EXPRESS WARRANTY. 
Respondents argue that assumption of the risk 
is no defense in an action for breach of express warranty. 
Finding no Utah cases on point, respondents cite a Kansas 
case, Young & Cooper, Inc. v. Vestring, 214 Kan. 311, 521 
P.2d 281 (1974) in support of its assertion. A closer 
reading of that opinion shows that respondents' reliance 
therein is misplaced. The quotation from that opinion on 
page 18 of respondents' brief is taken completely out of 
context. The language quoted, when taken with the body 
of the opinion, does not lay down a general rule that 
assumption of risk and contributory negligence are not 
defenses to an action for breach of an express warranty, 
but only that based upon the factual irregularities of 
that particular case the defenses were not assertible 
against those particular plaintiff-buyers. On the con-
trary, the opinion in Young & Cooper, Inc. v. Vestring 
reaffirms and cites the Kansas Supreme Court opinion in 
Huebert v. Federal Pacific Electric Co., Inc., 208 Kan. 
720, 494 P.2d 1210 (1972) which concluded that assumption 
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of the risk 1! a valid defense to an action based on an 
expr••• warranty. Young & Cooper, Inc. v. Vestring, 521 
P.2d at 292. Respondents' own authority simply sub-
•tantiates the appellant's earlier stated position. 
A reasonable construction of Utah case law 
leads to a similar conclusion. In Vernon v. Lake Motors, 
26 U.2d 269, 488 P.2d 302 (1971), the plaintiff Vernon 
sued defendant Lake Motors and Ford Motor Company for 
damages sustained when plaintiff's new automobile caught 
fire. The suit was based on breach of an express warranty 
given by the manufacturer and passed on by the dealer. 
Defendants asserted that plaintiff had assumed the risk 
of the damages sustained by using the automobile despite 
knowledge of a defect therein. 
The Supreme Court ruled that the knowing, vol-
untary, and unreasonable use of a dangerous product is 
a recognized defense to an express warranty action. Id. 
at 305. Appellant realizes, and the court pointed out, 
that the recognized defense was the form of assumption 
of risk which tracks contributory negligence. However, 
the court did not indicate that other forms of assump-
tion of risk are not valid defenses, the inference cer-
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tainly being that they are. Vernon v. Lake Motors sup-
ports such inference since the court held that under 
the factual setting therein there was a jury question 
as to whether the use of the automobile by the plaintiff, 
despite knowledge of a defect, was an unreasonable or 
reasonable use. Cf. Leishman v. Kamis Valley Lumber 
Company, 19 U.2d 150, 427 P.2d 747 (1967) [without using 
the term assumption of the risk the court implied that 
use of a product with knowledge of a defect is a valid 
defense to an action for breach of express warranty). 
If assumption of risk truly remains as a 
complete bar in a negligence action, the foregoing 
authorities dictate that it may be used to bar an action 
based on not only negligence but on breach of an express 
warranty. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ABUSE 
HIS DISCRETION BY ALLOWING 
APPELLANT TO AMEND ITS &~NDED 
ANSWER AT THE Titffi OF THE 
TRIAL. 
In their brief respondents assert that the trial 
court erred in allowing respondent to amend its amended 
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answer to set forth the defenses of assumption of risk 
and contributory negligence on the first day of trial. 
[Respondents' Brief at p. 19). They also contend that 
the failure to raise assumption of the risk and contri-
butory negligence in a responsive pleading constitutes a 
waiver of the defenses under Rule 12(a) Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure since the exception contained in Rule 
lS(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is inapplicable in 
this particular factual instance. In support respondents 
cite the Utah Supreme Court cases of General Insurance 
Company of America v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp., 545 P.2d 
502 (Utah 1976) and Cheney v. Rucker, 14 U.2d 205, 381 
P. 2d 86 (1963). 
Once again respondents' own authority under-
mines their argument. Under Rule 15(b), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, any party may make a motion at any time 
to amend the pleadings to conform to the evidence. 
The parties may, by express consent, 
or by the introduction of evidence 
without objection, amend the pleadings 
at will. During the trial if a party 
expressly requests leave to amend the 
conformed pleadings to the proof ad-
duced and to reflect issues raised by 
either expressed or implied consent, 
such leave should be granted. 
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The first part of Rule lS(b) 
should be contrasted with the second 
part where an amendment is offered 
during trial in response to an ob-
jection to evidence, in such a case, 
the standards set forth in the 
second part of Rule lS(b) will apply, 
viz., leave may be granted in absence 
of prejudice, undue delay, or laches. 
General Insurance Company of America v. Carnicero Dynesty 
Corp., 545 P.2d 502, 505-06. 
Cheney v. Rucker, 14 U.2d 205, 381 P.2d 86 
(1963) indicates how Rules B(c) and lS(b) interrelate. 
Plaintiff also raises the proced-
ural point that since defendants did 
not plead the subsequent agreement as 
an affirmative defense, they should not 
have been permitted to rely thereon. 
It is true, as plaintiff insists, that 
Rule 8(c) U.R.C.P., requires that af-
firmative defenses be pleaded. It is 
a good rule whose purpose is to have 
the issues to be tried clearly framed. 
But it is not the only rule in the book 
of Rules of Civil Procedure. They 
must all be looked to in the light of 
their even more fundamental purpose of 
liberalizing both pleading and pro-
cedure to the end that the parties are 
afforded the privilege of presenting 
whatever legitimate contentions they 
have pertaining to their dispute. What 
they are entitled to is notice of the 
issues raised and an opportunity to 
meet them. When this is accomplished, 
that is all that is required. 
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JA• at 91. Under such rationale the court in Cheney 
affiraed a ruling of the lower court that the defendant 
be allowed to amend his pleadings: the trial court was 
held not to have abused the discretion it held over the 
amendment procedure since the complaining party was 
apparently unconvincing in showing how he had been dis-
advantaged and, further, he made no request for a con-
tinuance. 
The aforecited cases clearly dispell respond-
ents point of contention. Respondents clearly had 
notice of appellant's intent. The original answer raised 
both defenses. The amended answer pled comparative negli-
gence which encompasses contributory negligence. Defend-
ant could have waited until some objection was made at trial 
as to the evidence it sought to have admitted before mov-
ing to make the amendment. In light of the rules propounded 
in General Insurance Company of America and Cheney, the 
court would have the discretion to allow the amendment at 
that time as well. If per chance respondents had failed to 
object at trial, the defenses would be deemed tried by 
implied consent and thereby become a part of the pleadings. 
10 
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Appellant's motion at the start of trial vaa 
made at that time rather than later during the trial to 
provide the Court adequate opportunity to avoid any pre-
judice to the other party. Respondents' argument regard-
ing the manner in which they were prejudiced by appellant's 
motion was unconvincing to the lower court. It is also 
interesting to note that respondents did not request any 
continuance despite the "extremely prejudicial" effect 
which they alleged appellant's motion would have upon its 
case. In fact, respondents represented to the court that 
the court could reserve its ruling on the matter since it 
would have no effect upon its trial preparation. 
52]. 
[R. sso-
In retrospect it is extremely difficult to see 
any way in which the court's exercise of discretion 
hindered respondents in the presentation of their case. 
Respondents own actions in the wake of appellant's motion 
indicate that their assertion of prejudice was clearly 
more one of form than substance. In light of the attend-
ant circumstances and their application to the law, it 
is evident that the lower court exercised its discretion 
properly and that the problem was dealt with at the most 
11 
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expeditious time possible. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL JUDGE PROPERLY 
SUBMITTED THE ISSUES OF 
ASSUMPTION OF RISK AND 
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE TO 
THE JURY AND THE VERDICT 
RETURNED BY THE JURORS SUB-
STANTIATES THE PROPRIETY OF 
THE TRIAL JUDGE'S ACTION. 
In Point IV of their brief, respondents assert 
that the trial judge erred in not directing the jurors, 
by way of instruction, that respondents had not assumed 
the risk of injury. In Point V, the respondents make a 
similar argument with respect to directing the issue of 
respondents' contributory negligence. On both points 
respondents contend that, as a matter of law, the evidence 
adduced at trial failed to establish either defense. 
In order to properly address respondents' 
argument it is imperative to put it in the context of the 
standard to be used by a trial court in making a ruling 
on a request for a directed verdict. In making its 
ruling ~pon a motion for a directed verdict as to an 
issue or issues, the trial court is obliged to view the 
evidence advanced to prove the issue in a light most 
12 
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favorable to the party against whom the directed verdict 
is sought. Anderson v. Gribble, 3 U.2d 68, 513 P.2d 432, 
434 (1973). This means that the trial court must take 
all the testimony on point, as well as any reasonable 
inferences which tend to prove the case of the party 
against whom the directed verdict is sought, as true. It 
must also disregard any conflicts in the evidence which 
cut against the position of such party. Koer v. Mayfair 
Markets, 19 u.2d 339, 431 P.2d 566, 568 (1967). If after 
reviewing the evidence and inferences therefrom in such 
light, any doubts the trial court may have as to what 
action is appropriate are to be resolved in favor of 
submitting the issues to the jury. Smith v. Franklin, 
14 u.2d 16, 376 P.2d 541, 544 (1962). The trial court 
must bear in mind its duty in a jury trial to submit to 
the jury any theory of the party which is supported by 
some evidence. Hall v. Blackham, 18 U.2d 164, 417 P.2d 
664, 666 (1966). Only in the most extreme circumstances 
should an issue be taken from the jury. 
Once the trial court exercises its on-the-spot 
judgment and submits the issue to a jury, its decision 
13 
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to do •o will only be upset by a reviewing court under 
the most extreme circumstances. In reviewing the trial 
court's decision as to a directed verdict, the Supreme 
Court will look at the trial court's decision in the 
light most favorable to the nonmoving party and will 
afford such party the benefit of all possible inferences 
which may have been considered by the lower court. Curtis 
v. Harmon Electronics, Inc., 575 P.2d 1044, 1046 (1978). 
The trial court's decision in the present in-
stance was shown to be justified when the jury returned 
its special verdict finding that not only were respondents 
contributorily negligent but that they had assumed the 
risk of the damages sustained. 
Jury verdict's are not to be easily upset. In 
light of the jury's specific findings, any attack upon 
the verdict or the actions of the trial court with regard 
thereto must overcome the strong presumption of verity 
afforded such findings and actions by the reviewing court. 
Bezner v. Continental Dry Cleaners, Inc., 548 P.2d 897, 
901 (Utah 1976). 
14 
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The reviewing court is to afford the verdict 
of the jury all possible presumptions in its favor. The 
court is obliged to assume that the jury properly follow-
ed the given instructions. Brown v. Johnson, 24 U.24 388, 
472 P.2d 942 (1970). All facts are to be reviewed in 
favor of the verdict. Barlow Upholstery & Furniture Co. 
v. Emmel, 533 P.2d 900, 902 (1975). The verdict is not 
to be upset unless, after taking all of the evidence and 
inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to sus-
taining the verdict, it appears that the verdict is 
entirely without foundation and evidence and that the 
determinations of the jurors are so fragmentary and in-
substantial no reasonable mind could have reached such 
a conclusion. Porter v. Price, 11 U.2d 80, 355 P.2d 66, 
67 (1960); Prince v. Peterson, 538 P.2d 1325, 1329 (1975). 
When the foregoing legal principles are applied 
to the facts herein it becomes readily apparent that the 
trial judge acted properly in submitting the issues of 
respondents assumption of the risk and contributory negli-
gence to the jury and that the findings of the jury must 
be sustained on this appeal. 
15 
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As to the doctrine of assumption of risk there 
1•, at the very least, "some evidence" in the record to 
validate both the submission of that issue' to the jury and 
the jury verdict. Respondent Jacobsen Construction Company 
felt from the outset that fiberglass was improperly 
specified for holding tanks of this size. [R. 752]. 
Various supervisors and officers visited the Structo-Lite 
yard during construction of the tanks and noticed various 
defects in the construction and also that some components 
were missing. [R. 843, 851, 1166-68]. And despite reports 
from American Testing Lab stating that the clamping pro-
cedures used by appellant were "hit and miss" [R. 986-87], 
Jacobsen did not require appellant to perform any tests on 
the tanks. [R. 903, 1170]. 
When delivered, the tanks still contained many 
of the imperfections and irregularities observed by the 
Jacobsen people earlier and some were not even complete 
at the time they were delivered. [R. 1171-72]. 
Hydrostatic tests run by respondent-Jacobsen's 
employees revealed many leaks in several of the tanks 
when filled with water to a depth of only three to four 
feet. [R. 939, 950, 1133]. Yet despite knowledge of 
16 
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these wide-ranging problems and irregularities, and while 
also knowing that chemical alum was much heavier than 
water [R. 1178), the tanks were never tested with alum. 
[R. 914). After the hydrostatic testing was completed 
and at least some of the leaks were repaired, the tanks 
still had visible expansion humps in various areas. 
[R. 1179). 
Respondent Conservancy District had similar 
knowledge of the problems with the tanks. Never confid-
ent in the design of the tanks [R. 1082), the District 
never chose ro tun a tension test [R. 1083) while ad-
mittedly knowing that appellant wasn't running quality 
tests of any kind. [R. 1071). The District also re-
viewed the American Testing Lab's reports detailing the 
"hit and miss" clamping procedures the inspector ob-
served [R. 986) and personally observed deficiencies in 
the fiberglass application procedures. [R. 987). 
The District was thoroughly familiar with the 
specifications for the tanks [R. 1056] and knew that 
tests would have to be made. [R. 1058]. The chief 
engineer for the District had visited the Structo-Lite 
site and observed similar irregularities to those found 
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by the Jacobsen inspectors. [R. 1060]. The District 
knew of the leaks found during the hydrostatic testing. 
[R. 994]. And yet while knowing that alum would be 
heavier than water, it too chose not to run any tests 
using a heavier solution prior to putting the tanks in 
operation. 
Respondents' actions might seem unreasonable, 
given their choice to proceed to fill the tanks with alum 
despite the extent of the known defects and their ad-
mitted suspicions concerning Structo-Lite manufacturing 
processes. [R. 1060]. However, the respondents' actions 
must be put into the context of the time pressures they 
were working under. Respondents had experienced signi-
ficant problems with getting appellant to deliver the 
tanks on schedule. Delays were costly and concern was 
mounting as to whether or not the tanks would be deli-
vered in time to complete the roof of the building before 
winter arrived. [R. 1131-33]. It is at least a jury 
question as to whether or not respondents' actions were 
not entirely reasonable in accepting the tanks in an un-
completed state with the thought in mind that repairs 
could be made following installation and roofing. After 
the tanks were in and the hydrostatic testing in the 
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Spring revealed, once again, the defective nature of the 
tanks, the decision to fill the tanks with alum and 
commence operation of the facility without further test-
ing may also be viewed as a reasonable choice in light 
of the need to put the plant in immediate operation to 
prepare for an anticipated serious summer drought. (R. 
998-99]. 
Respondents' knowledge of the seriously de-
l 
ficient nature of the planning surrounding the use of 
fiberglass tanks and the defects contained in the tanks 
themselves, when coupled with an arguably reasonable 
rationale for making such choice, compel a conclusion 
that the issue was properly given to the jury and the 
respondents' own proposed instructions to which, of course, 
respondents raise no objection. 
!/ While actual knowledge is usually required before one 
is said to have assumed the risk of injury, an actual 
statement that one subjectively knew of the dangers 
involved is not always necessary. In order to prevent 
a plaintiff from eliminating his responsibility under the 
doctrine by merely testifying that he did not know of 
the risk, many cases have said,in effect,that a plain-
tiff is not to be believed where he says he did not 
comprehend a risk which must have been quite clear and 
obvious to him. In effect, an objective element enters 
the case. See W. Prosser, Law of Torts, §68 at P· 448. 
The case at hand certainly must fall within this category. 
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Respondents' contention that the jury could 
not possibly find them contributorily negligent upon the 
facts at hand not only stretches the imagination but is 
premised upon a misstatement of authority. Respondents 
allege that they were not contributorily negligent since 
they did not have actual knowledge that use of the tanks 
as fabricated was dangerous. [Respondents' Brief at p. 35]. 
By their argument respondents seek to equate the require-
ments of the defenses of contributory negligence and 
assumption of risk, apparently in a hope to strengthen 
their earlier argument that assumption of risk has been 
swallowed up into comparative negligence. In support of 
their position that one must have knowledge of a danger 
to be deemed contributorily negligent, respondents cite 
Rogalski v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 3 U.2d 203, 282 P.2d 
304 (1955). ln Rogalski the plaintiff was injured when 
he fell into a vat of caustic acid while steam cleaning 
his employer's truck. Testimony at trial would have 
allowed the jury to conclude that plaintiff did not see 
the vat because of the steam. Defendant appealed the 
verdict for plaintiff on the ground that the court should 
have found plaintiff guilty as a matter of law. 
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On appeal the Supreme Court, citing Knox v. 
~· 229 P.2d 874, 876 (1951) restated the general rule 
that "a plaintiff will not be held to have been guilty 
of contributory negligence if it appears that he had 
• no knowledge or means of knowledge of the danger 
Rogalski v. Phillips Petroleum Co., supra, at 308 
[emphasis added]. The court's language is merely another 
way of stating the traditional "knew or should have 
known" bedrock test for contributory negligence. That 
such was the intent in Rogalski is substantiated by the 
court's affirmation of the trial court's verdict on the 
basis that it was for the jury to determine whether or 
not plaintiff Rogalski exercised reasonable care and cau-
tion in continuing around the truck, using the fender as 
a guide, while unable to see due to the cloud of steam. 
Id. at 3 08. 
When applying the above-stated rule to the 
facts of the matter at hand it becomes apparent that 
even if, arguendo, the evidence and testimony recited 
above with regard to assumption of the risk is deemed in-
sufficient to establish that defense due to, ~· lack 
of knowledge, there can be little doubt that such evidence, 
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and the inferences to be derived thereform, overwhelming-
ly corroborate the finding of the jury that respondents 
were contributorily negligent, i.e., that they should 
have been aware of the danger. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondents have failed in their attempts to 
show any reason why the verdict returned by the jury 
should be overturned as to the findings of assumption 
of risk and contributory negligence. There is certainly 
credible evidence in the record which, when taken with 
the inferences which may reasonably be derived therefrom, 
substantiate the jury's finding that not only were 
respondents contributorily negligent in using the de-
fective fiberglass tanks, but that they accepted a cal-
culated risk by pressing the defective tanks into use 
in order to ~eet their time table, whle having knowledge 
of the seriously defective nature of such tanks. 
It is tortured reasoning at best to suggest 
that the Legislature's adoption of comparative negligence 
abrogated the principle that there is no duty owed to a 
person who voluntarily subjects himself to a known danger. 
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Whether such action is called "primary assumption of 
risk", "assumption of the risk", or "lack of duty,• 
makes no difference. 
Pending a contrary decision by this Court, 
Rigtrup v. Strawberry Water Users Association, when view-
ed in light of the authorities and principles cited 
herein, still appears to allow a defendant to assert the 
defense of assumption of risk as a complete bar in not 
only a negligence action but, in an action for breach of 
express warranty as well. Appellant therefore respect-
fully contends that the trial court in this matter erred 
in its failure to grant appellant a judgment of no cause 
of action against respondents to which they were entitled 
based upon the special verdict returned by a properly 
instructed jury. 
Respectfully submitted this ~ay of January, 
1980. 
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